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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, there are two models on differential privacy: the cen-
tral model and the local model. The central model focuses on the
machine learning model and the local model focuses on the train-
ing data. In this paper, we study the input perturbation method in
differentially private empirical risk minimization (DP-ERM), pre-
serving privacy of the central model. By adding noise to the original
training data and training with the ‘perturbed data’, we achieve
(ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy on the final model, along with some kind
of privacy on the original data. We observe that there is an interest-
ing connection between the local model and the central model: the
perturbation on the original data causes the perturbation on the
gradient, and finally the model parameters. This observation means
that our method builds a bridge between local and central model,
protecting the data, the gradient and the model simultaneously,
which is more superior than previous central methods. Detailed
theoretical analysis and experiments show that ourmethod achieves
almost the same (or even better) performance as some of the best
previous central methods with more protections on privacy, which
is an attractive result. Moreover, we extend our method to a more
general case: the loss function satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz con-
dition, which is more general than strong convexity, the constraint
on the loss function in most previous work.
KEYWORDS
differential privacy, machine learning, input perturbation, empirical
risk minimization
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, machine learning has been shown effective in fields
such as pattern recognition and data mining [48], [34], [8], [23] and
large quantities of personal data has been collected to support ma-
chine learning algorithms. The collection of tremendous data leads
a huge problem: the disclosure of personal sensitive information.
In real scenarios, not only the leakage of original data will disclose
the information of individuals, when training machine learning
models, model parameters may reveal sensitive information in an
undirect way as well [37], [22].
To solve the problem of information leakage, differential privacy
(DP) [17], [18] was proposed and has become a popular way to
preserve privacy in machine learning. It preserves sensitive infor-
mation by adding random noise, making an adversary can not infer
any single data instance in the dataset by observing model param-
eters. Differential privacy has received a great deal of attentions
and has been applied to regression [10], [38], [6], boosting [20],
[50], PCA [12], [42], GAN [45], [47], transfer learning [31], graph
algorithms [35], [39], [3], deep learning [36], [1] and other fields.
Empirical risk minimization (ERM), covering a wide variety of
machine learning tasks, is also bothered by privacy problems. There
is a long list of works on DP-ERM [43], [4], [11], [49], [29]. Accord-
ing to different ways of adding noise, three approaches were pro-
posed to achieve differential privacy: output perturbation, objective
perturbation and gradient perturbation, adding noise to the final
model, the objective function and the gradient, respectively.
However, the original data is not preserved by perturbationmeth-
ods mentioned above. In real scenarios, before training, original
data is sent to a ‘data center’, which is trusted in central models,
shown in Figure 1 (a). When it comes to the situation that ‘data
center’ is not trusted, local differential privacy (LDP) [5], [27] was
proposed to provide plausible deniability, by randomizing the data
before releasing it. As shown in Figure 1 (b), LDP focuses on the pri-
vacy of the communications between individuals and the ‘server’,
rather than the final machine learning model [15], [40], [41], [16],
[44]. However, the noise added for preserving privacy in LDP is
always large, compromising predictive performance.
To alleviate the problems mentioned above, in this paper, we
study the input perturbation method, achieving (ϵ ,δ )-differential
privacy on the final model. The comparison between our method
and previous perturbation methods is shown in Figure 1. It can be
observed that our method focuses on the final model and preserves
the original data to some extents. Even if the adversaries get the per-
turbed data in the ‘data center’, the leakage of sensitive information
decreases a lot compared with traditional central models. Actually,
adding noise to original data to preserve privacy is commonly used
in the field of computer vision [26], [21], [30]. In this way, it is not
easy to reconstruct the original data [2].
By adding noise to original data, protections are applied before
‘data input’, and our method is more reliable than traditional central
models. Moreover, we observe that our input perturbation method
also perturbs the gradient and the final model parameters, building
a bridge between local and central differential privacy.
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(a) Central differential privacy
(b) Local differential privacy
(c) Our Method
Figure 1: Different perturbation methods.
Contributions of Our Method
A Bridge between Local and Central Differenital Privacy.
By observing a fact that the noise added to data causes perturba-
tion on the gradient and finally the final model, we build a bridge
between local and central differential privacy, guaranteeing (ϵ ,δ )-
differential privacy on the final model along with some kind of
privacy on the original data simultaneously. When comparing with
traditional central perturbation methods, in which the privacy of
original data is ignored, we provide more privacy. Meanwhile, com-
paring with LDP, we make a balance on the performance and the
privacy of individuals: adding less noise and keeping better perfor-
mance. Additionally, the privacy on the final model remains.
Superior Theoretical and Experimental Results. Detailed
theoretical analysis and experiments show that the performance
of our method is similar to (or even better than) some of the best
previous methods in central setting. Considering that our method
preserves both the original data and the final model and other cen-
tral methods ignore the security of original training data, the results
are attractive. When it comes to LDP, although in our method, the
privacy between individuals and the ‘data center’ is weaker, the
performance of our method is much better, which is a trade-off and
the sacrifice is acceptable.
A More General Condition. Considering that most previous
works assume the loss function is strongly convex, we general-
ize it to the condition that the loss function satisfies the Polyak-
Lojasiewicz condition, which is more general than strong convexity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce some works related to our method. We introduce some
basic definitions and formulations in Section 3. In Section 4, we
propose our method: input perturbation in detail. In Section 5, we
give the theoretical analysis of our method and extend it to a more
general case. We present the experimental results in Section 6.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we introduce some work on private ERM methods
and list the comparison of their theoretical results.
The first work on DP-ERM was proposed in [11], in which two
methods were proposed: output perturbation and objective per-
turbation. The probability density function of the noise v(b) =
1
α e
−γ ∥b ∥ , where α is a normalizing constant, γ is a function of the
privacy budget ϵ and ∥ · ∥ denotes ℓ2-norm. In this work, the de-
rivative of the loss function ∇ℓ(·) was assumed L-Lipschitz. Based
on these assumptions, it provided theoretical analysis on the noise
bound and the excess empirical risk bound. The noise of the method
proposed in [11] was improved by [29]. The improved noise is re-
lated to the upper bound of ∥∇ℓ(·)∥, ζ (i.e. ∥∇ℓ(θ )∥ ≤ ζ for all θ ).
Additionally, this work assumed the perturbed objective function
is ∆-strongly convex, and gives the excess empirical risk bound,
which is related to the noise b and the optimal model θˆ .
By gradient perturbation, [4] added noise to the gradient, guar-
anteeing differential privacy by assuming that the loss function
ℓ(·) is G-Lipschitz. Like in [11], [49] proposed an output perturba-
tion method, achieving a better excess empirical bound. Advanced
gradient descent method Prox-SVRG [46] was introduced in [43],
and a new algorithm DP-SVRG was proposed. DP-SVRG achieved
optimal or near optimal utility bounds with less gradient complex-
ity. In this work, the noise bound was related tom, the sampling
iterations in the algorithm DP-SVRG. Note that in DP-SVRG, better
results are because of advanced gradient descent method, rather
than advanced perturbation method.
However, all the methods proposed in previous work are based
on output perturbation, objective perturbation or gradient pertur-
bation. As a result, privacy preserving is after ‘data input’, which
increases the risk of information leakage. Although LDP can solve
the problem of ‘untrusted data center’, the theoretical results are
much worse, which can be observed in Table 11.
Under these circumstances, input perturbation was proposed in
[24], in which although noise is added to data, it achieves differ-
ential privacy by constructing a ‘perturbed objective function’. It
guarantees (O(√nϵ),δ )-LDP and (ϵ ,δ )-central DP. However, consid-
ering that n is always large, the LDP is unsatisfactory. Moreover, its
excess empirical risk bound is also much weaker than some central
models because the noise added to the original data is large.
Considering the problems mentioned above, in this paper, we
focus on input perturbation, adding noise to the original data and
1The theoretical results of LDP and input perturbation in Table 1 are simplified, more
details can be found in [40], [15] and [24].
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Table 1: Comparison between our method and other methods on noise bound and excess empirical risk bound.
Method δ = 0 Noise Type Noise Bound Excess Empirical Risk Bound
[11] Output Perturbation Yes v(b) = 1α e−γ ∥b ∥ γ = O (nλϵ) O
(
p2 log2(p/δ )(L+λ)
λ2n2ϵ 2
)
[11] Objective Perturbation Yes v(b) = 1α e−γ ∥b ∥ γ = O
(
ϵ − log(1 + 2Lnλ + L
2
n2λ2 )
)
O
(
p2 log2(p/δ )
λn2ϵ 2
)
[29] Objective Perturbation No Gaussian Noise2 O
(
ζ 2(ϵ+log(4/δ 2))
ϵ 2
)
O
( ∥b ∥2
n2∆ + ∆∥θˆ ∥2
)
[4] Gradient Perturbation No Gaussian Noise O
(
G2n2 log(n/δ ) log(1/δ )
ϵ 2
)
O
(
G2p log2(n/δ ) log(1/δ )
n∆ϵ 2
)
[49] Output Perturbation No Gaussian Noise O
(
G2(1+L/∆)2 log(2/δ )
n2L2ϵ 2
)
O
(
LG2p log(1/δ )
n2ϵ 2∆2
)
[43] (DP-SVRG) Gradient Perturbation No Gaussian Noise O
(
G2Tm log(1/δ )
n2ϵ 2
)
O
(
G2p log(n) log(1/δ )
n2∆ϵ 2
)
[43] (traditional) Gradient Perturbation No Gaussian Noise O
(
G2T log(1/δ )
n2ϵ 2
)
O
(
G2p log(n) log(1/δ )
n2ϵ 2
)
[15] LDP Yes Randomized response None3 O
(
Gp
ϵ
√
n
)
[40] LDP Yes Laplace Noise2 O
(
pnϵ2
)
O
( √
p
(√nϵ )
L
L+2p
)
[24] Input Perturbation No Gaussian Noise O
(
G2(log(16/δ )+ϵ )
nϵ 2
)
O
(
pG2(log(16/δ 2)+ϵ )
Lnϵ
)
Our Method Input Perturbation No Gaussian Noise O
(
G2T log(1/δ )
n(n−1)√∆ϵ 2
)
O
(
α (2LD+G)G3d log2(n) log(1/δ )
n(n−1)√∆ϵ 2
)
2 The noise bound of the Gaussian and Laplace noise and are represented by the variance, whose means are 0.
3 The noise added by randomized response is complicated, details can be found in [15].
4 n is the size of training set, T is the number of total iterations, p is the number of model parameters, input x has d-dimensional feature.
training machine learning model by the ‘perturbed data’. By observ-
ing the effects caused by input perturbation: noise added to the data
leads perturbation on the gradient and the final model parameters,
our method provides (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy on the final model,
which is the same as central setting, along with some kinds of pro-
tections on original data, showing the connections between local
and central differential privacy. Theoretical comparisons between
our method and previous methods are shown in Table 1.
It can be observed that the noise bound of our method is better
than the gradient perturbation method proposed in [43]. For which
the advanced gradient descent algorithm DP-SVRG is used, the
difference is by a factor ofm
√
∆. For traditional gradient descent
method in [43], the difference is
√
∆. When comparing with the
method proposed in [4], our method is much better, the difference
is up to n
4√∆ log(n/δ )
T . When it comes to the input perturbation
method proposed in [24], our noise bound is better than it approxi-
mately by a factor of n.
The excess empirical risk bound of our method is related to
the upper bound of the ℓ2-norm of the model parameters, D (i.e.
∥θ ∥ ≤ D). Our method is better than traditional gradient perturba-
tion method proposed in [4] by a factor of α (2LD+G)Gd
√
∆
np , almost
d
np , considering α(2LD + G)G
√
∆ can be seemed as a constant.
When comparing with the methods proposed in [43], our method
achieves almost the same excess empirical risk bound, the difference
is approximately d log(n)p , no matter the advanced gradient descent
algorithm, DP-SVRG, is used or not. In some scenarios that p ≫ d
(such as neural network), this gap can be ignored. Meanwhile, the
excess empirical risk bound of our method is much better than the
input perturbation method proposed in [24], approximately by a
factor of 1n , which is a huge gap. Considering that the (O(
√
nϵ),δ )-
LDP guaranteed by the input perturbation method proposed in [24]
is unsatisfactory (actually, this privacy is really weak because n is
always up to hundreds or thousands), the sacrifice on LDP for the
improvement on performance in our method is acceptable.
In this paper, we add noise to data, leading the perturbation on
the gradient and achieves (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy on the model
parameter, building a bridge between local and central differential
privacy. By detailed analysis, it can be observed that the theoretical
results of our method are similar to (or even better than) previous
central perturbation methods. Experimental results also show that
the performance of our proposed method is similar to the gradient
perturbation method proposed in [43] and the output perturbation
method proposed in [49]. Our method preserves the privacy of
the gradient, (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy on final model parameters
along with some kind of original data privacy, without decreases
on theoretical or practical results, which is an attractive result.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, first, we introduce some basic definitions, including
the comparison between central and local differential privacy. Then,
we list traditional perturbation methods of central differentially
private ERM in detail: output perturbation, objective perturbation
and gradient perturbation.
3.1 Notations and Basic Definitions
Given a d-dimensional vector x=[x1,x2, ...,xd ]⊤, denotes its ℓ2-
norm by ∥x∥=(∑di=1 |xi |2) 12 . Two databases D,D ′ ∈ Dn differing
by one element are denoted by D ∼ D ′, called adjacent databases.
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Definition 1 (Central Differential Privacy [19]). A ran-
domized function A : Dn → Rp is (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy if
P[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵP[A(D ′) ∈ S] + δ , (1)
where S ∈ range(A) and p is the number of parameters.
Definition 2 (Local Differential Privacy [41]). An algorithm
Q is (ϵ ,δ )-local differential privacy if for all x ,x ′ ∈ D, and for all
events E in the output space of Q, we have:
P[Q(x) ∈ E] ≤ eϵP[Q(x ′) ∈ E] + δ . (2)
According to the definitions of central and local differential pri-
vacy, in Definition 1, datasets D and D ′ are input to the randomized
function A, the privacy of the machine learning model is focused,
guaranteeing information cannot be inferred by observing thema-
chine learning model. In Definition 2, records x and x ′ are input
to the algorithm Q, data is paid more attention, guaranteeing in-
formation cannot be inferred by observing the ‘noisy data’. In the
local model, ‘untrusted server’ is seemed as the malicious adversary.
3.2 Traditional Perturbation Methods
Our method focuses more on the privacy of the machine learning
model, similar to the central setting. So, in this part, we introduce
three traditional central perturbation methods.
In general, the objective function of ERM without privacy pre-
serving is defined as:
L(θ ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(θ ,xi ,yi ), (3)
where (xi ,yi ) denotes data instance, ℓ(·) is the loss function.
In the case of binary classification, the data space X = Rd and
the label set Y = {−1,+1}, and we assume throughout that X is
the unit ball so that ∥xi ∥ ≤ 1.
Output Perturbation. In output perturbation, noise is directly
added to the model (in the paper, we denote model by parameters):
θpr iv = argmin [L(θ )] + z, (4)
where z is the noise guaranteeing differential privacy.
Output Perturbation method is commonly used because it is
simple to implement, only adding noise to the final model.
Objective Perturbation. In the method of objective perturba-
tion, noise is added to the objective function:
Lpr iv (θ ) = L(θ ) + 1
n
zT θ . (5)
The perturbed objective function Lpr iv (θ ) is directly optimized:
θpr iv = argmin
[
Lpr iv (θ )
]
. (6)
Note that in (5), there may be some other terms on the right side
of the equality, for example ∆2 ∥θ ∥2 in [29]. We only list the most
important term 1n z
T θ to guarantee differential privacy here.
This method is rarely used in recent years because it is always
a trouble to optimize the perturbed objective function and the
performance is unsatisfactory.
Gradient Perturbation. In the gradient perturbation method,
noise is added to the gradient when training, which leads the gra-
dient descent process at round t to:
θt+1 = θt − α(∇L(θt ) + z), (7)
where α is the learning rate.
After T iterations in total, the final model θpr iv = θT .
Because most machine learning algorithms are based on gradient
descent method, gradient perturbation is feasible and popular.
4 DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE ERMWITH
INPUT PERTURBATION
In this section, first, we analyze theweaknesses of traditional central
perturbationmethods and local models introduced in Section 3, then
we propose our method input perturbation in detail.
When training models, original data is always sent to the ‘data
center’ in advance, which is shown in Figure 1. By observing three
traditional perturbation methods of central DP-ERM, original data
is not protected, which means the ‘data center’ is assumed trusted.
However, ‘data center’ is not easy to ‘trust’ because the adver-
saries always desire to ‘take away’ the original data and the ‘data
center’ may be monitored with high probability. As a result, the
security of original data instances is of the same importance as (or
even more important than) the model parameters. LDP is a superior
way to solve the problem of ‘untrusted data center’, guaranteeing
differential privacy over the communications (data exchanging)
between individuals and the ‘data center’. However, as shown in
Table 1, the noise added to data is large, and it is inevitable that the
performance is worse than central models.
To solve the problems mentioned above, we propose a new input
perturbation method, adding noise to data instances and training
themachine learningmodel by the ‘perturbed data instances’, which
leads the objective function to:
Lˆ(θ ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(θ ,xi + z,yi ). (8)
In order to distinguish with the objective function without pri-
vacy consideration L(θ ) in (3), we denote the objective function
of input perturbation by Lˆ(θ ). In (8), ‘noise adding’ has been done
in advance and the formulation xi + z is for distinguishing the
perturbed data and original data.
Ourmethod focuses on achieving (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy on the
machine learning model with some kind of privacy on original data.
As a result, even if the ‘data center’ is not trusted or monitored, the
data ‘taken away’ by malicious adversaries is with random noise,
which preserves the ‘true original data’ of individuals from some
kinds of attacks.
Although in our method, noise is added to the original data, we
focusmore on the (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy of the final model, which
is different from the local model: protections between individuals
and the ‘server’ are paid more attentions, and the privacy of model
parameters is not discussed. Comparing with LDP and input per-
turbation method in [24], based on the aim to guarantee the quality
of the machine learning model, we sacrifice some of the privacy
on individuals for the performance. In fact, the sacrifice compared
with [24] is not much. In other words, focusing on keeping good
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performance, we attempt to preserve the privacy on original data
as much as possible. It can be observed that in LDP and previous
input perturbation method, the noise added to data is much more
than ours. As a result, the privacy preserving on individuals of our
method is weaker than in LDP and previous input perturbation
method, but still stronger than central methods.
Our method is detailed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private ERM with Input Perturbation
Method
Require: Dataset D, iteration rounds T , learning rate α
1: function InputPerturbation(D,T ,α )
2: For all data instances (xi ,yi ) in D, add noise z to it:
3: (xi ,yi ) ← (xi + z,yi ).
4: New data (xi + z,yi ) is denoted as ‘perturbed data’.
5: Train model by perturbed data, the objective function is
the same as (8), which leads the following process.
6: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
7: θt+1 ← θt − α 1n
∑n
i=1 ∇Lˆ(θt ).
8: end for
9: return θT .
10: end function
In Algorithm 1, the random noise z ∼ Rd and each element
zi ∼ N(0,σ 2), sampled independently. By line 7 in Algorithm 1,
it can be seen that the noise added to the original data affects the
gradient. The theoretical analysis of our method in Section 5 is
based on this observation.
Besides, by observing that our method adds noise to original
data instances, leading perturbation on the gradient and eventually
causing perturbation on the model parameters, a bridge is built
between local and central differential privacy: input perturbation
ERM protects the original data, the gradient and the final model
simultaneously, giving a higher level privacy compared with tra-
ditional central perturbation methods without decreases on the
theoretical or practical results. Meanwhile, we achieve better per-
formance compared with LDP and previous input perturbation
method, by sacrificing some amount of privacy on individuals.
5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF INPUT
PERTURBATION ERM
In this section, first, we give privacy guarantees of our proposed
method: input perturbation ERM. Then, we analyze the excess em-
pirical risk bound of our method. Finally, we extend our method
to a more general case, in which the loss function is not restricted
strongly convex but satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition,
which is more general than the property ‘strongly convex’.
5.1 Differential Privacy
In this part, we analyze the (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy of our proposed
method: input perturbation in Algorithm 1.
In this paper, we analyze (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy by Gaussian
mechanism proposed in [18] and moments accountant proposed in
[1]. Moreover, we assume ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is ℓ(yθT x) like in [11].
Theorem 1. In Algorithm 1, for ϵ,δ > 0, if ℓ(θ ,x ,y) isG-Lipschitz
and ∆-strongly convex over θ and
σ 2 = c
G2T log(1/δ )
n(n − 1)√∆ϵ2
, (9)
it is (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy for some constant c .
The proof is detailed in the Appendix.
It can be observed that by using our method, the noise added
to data instances is almost the same as the gradient perturbation
method proposed in [43]. The difference is by a factor of (n−1)
√
∆
n ,
which can be seen as a constant. When comparing with the tra-
ditional gradient perturbation method proposed in [4], our noise
bound is much better than it by a factor up to n
4 log(n)
T . Meanwhile,
the noise bound of our method is far better than LDP methods, con-
sidering that LDP preserves stronger privacy between individuals
and the ‘server’, and our method pays more attentions on the pri-
vacy of the final machine learning model, this result is conceivable.
The similarity between ourmethod and the gradient perturbation
method is the same as our observation: perturbation on original data
causes the perturbation on gradients, which builds a bridge between
local and central differential privacy. As a result, our proposed
input perturbation method achieves (ϵ ,δ )-DP on the final model
through this ‘bridge’. Hence, our method preserves the privacy of
the original data instances, the gradient and the model parameters
simultaneously, providing a higher level protection on privacy in a
more reliable way in the field of central DP-ERM.
5.2 Excess Empirical Risk Bound
In this part, we analyze the utility of our proposed method and
give the excess empirical risk bound, denoted by the expectation
of Lˆ(θT ) − L∗, where L∗ is the value of the objective function over
the optimal model without privacy consideration. Formally, L∗ =
minθ ∈Rp L(θ ), where L(θ ) is the same as in (3).
Theorem 2. Suppose that ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is G-Lipschitz, ∇ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is
L-Lipschitz5 and the ℓ2-norm of the model parameter has an upper
bound D (i.e. ∥θ ∥ ≤ D for all θ ), with σ is the same as in (9), we have:
E
[
Lˆ(θT ) − L∗
] ≤ O (α(2LD +G)G3d log2(n) log(1/δ )
n(n − 1)√∆ϵ2
)
, (10)
where T = O˜
(
log( n(n−1)
√
∆ϵ 2
α (2LD+G)G3d log(1/δ ) )
)
, α represents the learning
rate and each data instance xi ∈ X ∈ Rd has d-dimensional features.
The proof is shown in the Appendix.
Remark 1. Considering that the smoothness of the objective func-
tion after input perturbation Lˆ(θ ) is not easy to achieve because of the
existence of the random variable z, we assume L(θ ) (without random
variables) is L-smooth, which is easier to hold, making the utility and
the excess empirical risk bound of our method feasible.
It can be observed that the excess empirical risk bound of our
method is better than the traditional gradient perturbation method
proposed in [4] by a factor of α (2LD+G)Gd
√
∆
np . Considering that the
5L-Lipschitz on ∇ℓ(·) means L-smooth on ℓ(·).
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(a) KDDCup99 (LR) (b) Adult (LR) (c) Bank (LR)
(d) KDDCup99 (MLP) (e) Adult (MLP) (f) Bank (MLP)
Figure 2: Accuracy over ϵ on different datasets.
variables L,D,G,α ,∆ can be seemed as constants, our method in
much better than which proposed in [4] by a factor of dnp . When
comparing with gradient perturbation methods proposed in [43],
the gap on empirical risk bound is by a factor of d log(n)p . In some
cases that p ≫ d , which is common in the field such as deep
learning, the gap between ourmethod and the gradient perturbation
methods proposed in [43] is relatively small and can be ignored.
When it comes to the comparison between our method and LDP
methods, the excess empirical risk bound of our method is much
better, with weaker privacy on individuals.
5.3 More general condition
In this part, we extend our method to a more general condition that
the loss function ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is not restricted ∆-strongly convex, but
satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition.
Definition 3. Given a function ℓ(·), if there exists µ > 0 and for
all θ , we have:
∥∇ℓ(θ )∥2 ≥ 2µ(ℓ(θ ) − ℓ∗), (11)
then ℓ(·) satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition.
The Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition is much more general than
strongly convex. It was shown in [28] that when function ℓ is differ-
ential and L-smooth under ℓ2-norm, we have:
Strong Convex⇒ Essential Strong Convexity⇒Weak Strongly
Convexity⇒ Restricted Secant Inequality⇒ Polyak-Lojasiewicz
Inequality⇔ Error Bound
Theorem 3. In Algorithm 1, for ϵ,δ > 0, if the loss function
ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is G-Lipschitz and satisfies Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition
over θ and
σ 2 = c
G2T log(1/δ )
n(n − 1)ϵ2 , (12)
it is (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy for some constant c .
Detailed proof is shown in the Appendix.
Theorem 4. Suppose that ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is G-Lipschitz, ∇ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is
L-Lipschitz, L(θ ) is L-smooth over θ and the ℓ2-norm of the model
parameter has an upper bound D (i.e. ∥θ ∥ ≤ D), with σ is the same
as in (52), we have:
E
[
Lˆ(θT ) − L∗
] ≤ O (α(2LD +G)G3d log2(n) log(1/δ )
n(n − 1)ϵ2
)
, (13)
whereT = O˜
(
log( n(n−1)ϵ 2α (2LD+G)G3d log(1/δ ) )
)
, α is the learning rate and
each data instance xi has d-dimensional features.
The proof of Theorem 4 is almost the same as Theorem 2, with
replacement of σ .
By Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, it can be observed that in a more
general case: the loss function is not restricted strongly convex but
satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition, our noise bound and the
excess empirical risk bound are almost the same as previous work
on central models.
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(a) KDDCup99 (LR) (b) Adult (LR) (c) Bank (LR)
(d) KDDCup99 (MLP) (e) Adult (MLP) (f) Bank (MLP)
Figure 3: Optimality gap over ϵ on different datasets.
6 EXPERIMENTS
The experiments are performed on the classification task. Consider-
ing that our method focuses on the privacy of the final model, the
experiments are applied on central methods: the objective pertur-
bation method proposed in [29], the output perturbation method
proposed in [49] and the gradient perturbationmethods proposed in
[4] and [43] (without DP-SVRG). The performance is represented by
accuracy and the optimality gap, the latter is defined as L(θpr iv )−L∗.
Accuracy represents the performance on test data and optimal gap
denotes excess empirical risk on training data.
According to the sizes of datasets, we use logistic regression
model (LR) and deep learning model on the datasets KDDCup99
[25], Adult [14], Bank [33], where the total number of data instances
are 70000, 45222 and 41188, the sizes are large than 10000. On
datasets Breast Cancer [32], Credit Card Fraud [7], Iris [14], only
logistic regression model is applied because the sizes are less than
1000, where the total number of data instances are 699, 984 and 150,
respectively. In the experiments, deep learning model is denoted
by Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer whose size
is the same as the input layer. The training set and the testing set
are chosen randomly.
In all experiments, T and α are chosen by cross-validation. We
evaluate the influence over differential privacy budget ϵ , which
is set from 0.01 to 0.25. Meanwhile, δ is set according to the size
of datasets and can be seemed as a constant. Note that in logistic
regression model, d = p and in deep learning model, d < p.
Figure 2 shows that the accuracy of our proposedmethod is better
than the gradient perturbation method proposed in [4] and the
objective perturbation method proposed in [29]. And our method
is almost the same as the gradient perturbation method proposed
in [43] and the output perturbation method proposed in [49] on
accuracy, nomatter on the LRmodel or on theMLPmodel. However,
because the variance of the Gaussian noise added to the gradient
in the method [4] is large: O
(
G2n2 log(n/δ ) log(1/δ )
ϵ 2
)
, the accuracy
of this method over ϵ fluctuates sharply in Figure 2.
It can be observed that in Figure 3, the optimality gap of our
method is almost the same as the output perturbation method
proposed in [43] and is better than other methods mentioned above
over most datasets, which is similar to the theoretical analysis.
Moreover, it can be observed that the optimality gap of our method
on some datasets are close to 0, which means that our method
achieves almost the same performance as the ERM model without
privacy consideration in some scenarios, on both LR model and
MLP model. In addition, like the accuracy in Figure 2, the optimality
gap of the gradient perturbation method proposed in [4] fluctuates
sharply because of its noise bound.
Figure 4 shows accuracy and optimality gap on small datasets
(the sizes are less than 1000), in which only logistic regression
model is applied. The results are similar to which in Figure 2 and
Figure 3, which means that our method is effective in most cases.
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(a) Breast Cancer (LR) (b) Credit Card Fraud (LR) (c) Iris (LR)
(d) Breast Cancer (LR) (e) Credit Card Fraud (LR) (f) Iris (LR)
Figure 4: Accuracy and optimality gap over ϵ on different datasets.
By observing the experimental results, we find that although
there are slight differences in experimental results on different
datasets, the performance of the gradient perturbation method pro-
posed in [4] and the objective perturbation method proposed in
[29] is much weaker than our method, the former is because of
its loose noise bound and the latter is because of the perturbation
method itself. Our proposed method: input perturbation, is almost
the same as (on some datasets, even better than) the output per-
turbation method in [43] and the traditional gradient perturbation
method without DP-SVRG in [49] on both accuracy and optimality
gap, which is similar to our theoretical analysis in Section 4. The
experimental results on the deep learning model (MLP), are simi-
lar to the traditional machine learning (logistic regression) model.
Considering that our method preserves the privacy of the original
data, the gradient and the final model simultaneously, providing
more privacy without decreases on the performance compared with
previous central methods, it is an attractive result.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the input perturbation method in DP-ERM,
adding Gaussian noise to original data instances and training the
machine learning model by the ‘perturbed data’. By observing that
input perturbation leads the perturbation on the gradient and fi-
nally the perturbation on the final model, we build a bridge between
local and central differential privacy, achieving (ϵ ,δ )-differential
privacy on the final machine learning model, along with some kind
of privacy on individuals. Through the ‘bridge’, we preserve the
original data, the gradient and the final machine learning model
simultaneously. Meanwhile, we extend our method to a more gen-
eral condition, in which the loss function is not considered strongly
convex but satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition. Theoreti-
cal analysis and experiments (applied on both traditional machine
learning model: logistic regression, and deep learning model: MLP)
on real datasets show that our method achieves almost the same
(or even better) performance compared with some of the best pre-
vious methods. Additionally, higher level of privacy is achieved,
comparing with previous central methods. It is worth emphasizing
that our method adds noise to original data, independent of specific
optimization methods, which means that our proposed method
is a general paradigm. Moreover, detailed analysis of the privacy
preserved on individuals of our method and how to improve the
privacy of individuals will also be paid attentions in future work.
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A DETAILS OF PROOF
A.1 Theorem 1
Proof. By observing that the noise added to data causes the
perturbation on the gradient, we pay our attentions on the gradient
descent descent process:
θt+1 = θt −α∇Lˆ(θt ) = θt −α 1
n
n∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi +z))(xi +z), (14)
where z ∼ N(0,σ 2) and α denotes the learning rate.
Then, considering about the t th query which may disclose pri-
vacy, the randomized mechanismMt is:
Mt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))(xi + z). (15)
Denote probability distributions on adjacent databases D and D ′
over mechanismMt as P and Q :
P =
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))(xi + z) +
1
n
yn∇ℓ(ynθTt (xn + z))(xn + z),
Q =
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))(xi + z) +
1
n
y′n∇ℓ(y′nθTt (x ′n + z))(x ′n + z),
(16)
where we suppose that the single different data instance between D
and D ′ is the nth one, denoted as (xn ,yn ) and (x ′n ,y′n ), respectively.
For simplicity on expression, we set:
A =
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))xi ,B =
1
n
yn∇ℓ(ynθTt (xn + z))(xn + z),
B′ = 1
n
y′n∇ℓ(y′nθTt (x ′n + z))(x ′n + z),C =
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z)).
(17)
Then, by (16), (17) and note that z ∼ N(0,σ 2), we have:
P = N(A + B,Cσ 2), Q = N(A + B′,Cσ 2). (18)
In moments accountant method proposed in [1], the λth moment
αM (λ;D,D ′) on mechanismM is defined as:
αM (λ;D,D ′) = logEo∼M (D)
[
exp(λc(o;M,D,D ′))] , (19)
where c(o;M,D,D ′) is privacy loss at the output o, defined as:
c(o;M,D,D ′) = log P [M(D) = o]
P [M(D ′) = o] . (20)
When it comes to privacy preserving, it is necessary to bound
all possible αM (λ;D,D ′), denoted as αM (λ), which is defined as:
αM (λ) = max
D,D′
αM (λ;D,D ′). (21)
By Definition 2.1 in [9], Dα is defined as:
Dα (P ∥Q) = 1
α − 1 log
(
Ex∼P
[(
P(x)
Q(x)
)α−1])
. (22)
By (19), (20), (21), (22) and P , Q in (18), we have:
αMt (λ) = logEo∼P
[
exp
(
λ log( P
Q
)
)]
= logEo∼P
[(
P
Q
)λ ]
= λDλ+1(P ∥Q).
(23)
By (23) and Lemma 2.5 in [9], we have:
αMt (λ) = λDλ+1(P ∥Q) =
λ(λ + 1)∥(A + B) − (A + B′)∥2
2Cσ 2
. (24)
By definitions of B and B′ in (17) and note that ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is G-
Lipschitz (G), we have:
∥B−B′∥ = ∥ 1
n
∇ℓ(θt ,xn+z,yn )− 1
n
∇ℓ(θt ,x ′n+z,y′n )∥
(G)≤ 2G
n
. (25)
By [13], if function ℓ(θ ,x ,y) is ∆-strongly convex (∆), we have:
∥∇ℓ(θ ,x ,y)∥2 ≥ 2∆(ℓ(θ ,x ,y) − ℓ∗). (26)
Combining (26) and the definition of C in (17), we have:
C =
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))
(∆)≥ n − 1
n
√
2∆(ℓ(θt ) − ℓ∗). (27)
In general, with the increasing of training iteration, loss of the
model decreases. i.e. ℓ(θt1 ) ≤ ℓ(θt2 ) if t1 ≥ t2. So, we have:
C ≥ n − 1
n
√
2∆(ℓ(θT ) − ℓ∗). (28)
Considering that ℓ(θT ) − ℓ∗ can be seemed as a constant, by (25)
and (28), for some constant c1, (24) can be transferred to:
αMt (λ) ≤ c1
λ(λ + 1)G2√
∆σ 2n(n − 1)
. (29)
By Theorem 2.1 in [1], we have:
αM (λ) ≤
T∑
t=1
αMt (λ). (30)
By summing over T iterations on (29), for some constant c2:
αM (λ) ≤
T∑
t=1
αMt (λ) ≤ c1
λ(λ + 1)G2T√
∆σ 2n(n − 1)
≤ c2 λ
2G2T√
∆σ 2n(n − 1)
.
(31)
Taking σ 2 = c G
2T log(1/δ )
n(n−1)√∆ϵ 2 for some constant c , we can guarantee:
αM (λ) ≤ c2λ
2G2T
σ 2n(n − 1)√∆
≤ λϵ2 , (32)
and as a result, we have:
δ ≤ exp(−λϵ2 ), (33)
leading (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy according to Theorem 2.2 in [1].
□
A.2 Theorem 2
Proof. First, considering E
[
Lˆ(θt+1) − Lˆ(θt )
]
at round t :
E
[
Lˆ(θt+1) − Lˆ(θt )
]
= Ez
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
ℓ(yiθTt+1(xi + z)) − ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))
] ]
.
(34)
Note that ℓ(·) is G-Lipschitz (G), then for all x ,y:
ℓ(x) − ℓ(y) ≤ G |x − y | . (35)
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By the combination of (34) and (35), without loss of generality:
E
[
Lˆ(θt+1) − Lˆ(θt )
] (G)≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez
[
G
yiθTt+1(xi + z) − yiθTt (xi + z)]
≤ αG 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez
[
yi (−∇Lˆ(θt ))xi + yi (−∇Lˆ(θt ))z
]
.
(36)
By the definition of Lˆ(θ ) in (8), we have:
∇Lˆ(θt ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))(xi + z). (37)
Note that ∇ℓ(·) is L-Lipschitz (L), then we have:
∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z)) − ∇ℓ(yiθTt xi ) ≥ −L
yiθTt z . (38)
Then, by (37) and (38), we have:
∇Lˆ(θt ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt (xi + z))(xi + z)
]
(L)≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
yi
(
∇ℓ(yiθTt xi ) − L
yiθTt z) (xi + z)] . (39)
Note that yi ∈ [−1, 1] and ∥xi ∥ ≤ 1, (39) can be transferred to:
∇Lˆ(θt ) ≥ ∇L(θt ) − L∥θt ∥∥z∥ − L∥θt ∥∥z∥2 + 1
n
n∑
i=1
yi∇ℓ(yiθTt xi )z.
(40)
By combining (36) and (40), we have:
E
[
Lˆ(θt+1) − Lˆ(θt )
]
≤ αG 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez
[−∇L(θt ) + L∥θt ∥∥z∥2]
+ αG
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez
L∥θt ∥∥z∥2 −
1
n
n∑
j=1
yj∇ℓ(yjθTt x j )z2

(G)≤ −αG 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇L(θt ) + αG(2L∥θt ∥ +G)Ez
[∥z∥2] .
(41)
For random variable X, we have:
E(X 2) = E2(X ) +v(X ), (42)
where v(X ) denotes the variance of X.
By (42) and note that the random variable z ∼ (0,σ 2), (41) can
be transferred to:
E
[
Lˆ(θt+1) − Lˆ(θt )
]
≤ −αG 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇L(θt ) + αG(2L∥θt ∥ +G)dσ 2
(G)≤ G2α + αG(2L∥θt ∥ +G)dσ 2.
(43)
By summing (43) over T iterations and note that ∥θ ∥ ≤ D:
E
[
Lˆ(θT ) − Lˆ(θ0)
] ≤ G2αT + αG(2LD +G)dσ 2T . (44)
Then, considering the gap between Lˆ(θ0) and L∗:
E
[
Lˆ(θ0) − L∗
]
= E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(yiθT0 (xi + z)) − L∗
]
(G)≤ E
[
G
yiθT0 z + (L(θ0) − L∗)]
≤ G∥θ0∥E [∥z∥] + (L(θ0) − L∗)
= L(θ0) − L∗.
(45)
If ℓ(·) is L-smooth, we have:
L(θ0) − L∗ ≤
〈∇L(θ∗),θ0 − θ∗〉 + L2 ∥θ0 − θ∗∥2, (46)
where θ∗ denotes the optimal model and ∇L(θ∗) = 0.
Then, by (45) and (46), the inequality holds:
E
[
Lˆ(θ0) − L∗
] (L)≤ L2 ∥θ0 − θ∗∥2. (47)
Then, by combination of (44) and (47), we have:
E
[
Lˆ(θT ) − L∗
] ≤ G2αT + L2 ∥θ0 − θ∗∥2 +αG(2LD +G)dσ 2T . (48)
Taking σ the same as in (9), we have:
E
[
ˆL(θT ) − L∗
]
≤ O
(
α(2LD +G)G3d log2(n) log(1/δ )
n(n − 1)√∆ϵ2
)
, (49)
when T = O˜
(
log( n(n−1)
√
∆ϵ 2
α (2LD+G)G3d log(1/δ ) )
)
, where the notation O˜(·)
is similar toO(·), but hiding factors polynomial in logn and log(1/δ ).
□
A.3 Theorem 3
Proof. TakingMt , P ,Q,A,B,B′,C the same as in A.1.
Note that the loss function ℓ(θ ,x ,y) satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz
condition (PL), we have:
C ≥ n − 1
n
√
2µ(ℓ(θt ) − ℓ∗). (50)
As a result, in the moments accountant method:
αMt (λ)
(PL)≤ 2λ(λ + 1)G
2√
2µ(ℓ(θT ) − ℓ∗)n(n − 1)σ 2
. (51)
The factor
√
2µ(ℓ(θT ) − ℓ∗) can be seemed as a constant, then:
αMt (λ) ≤ c1
2λ(λ + 1)G2
n(n − 1)σ 2 , (52)
for some constant c1.
By summing T iterations, for some constant c2, we have:
αM (λ) ≤ c2 λ
2G2T
σ 2n(n − 1) . (53)
Taking σ the same as in (9), it can be guaranteed that:
αM (λ) ≤ λϵ2 , (54)
and as a result:
δ ≤ exp(−λϵ2 ), (55)
for some constant c , which means (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy due to
Theorem 2.2 in [1]. □
